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INTRODUCTION 
Although ERISA preemption was ranked among the top "eight pertinent 
issues"l that needed to be addressed in order to achieve comprehensive health care 
reform, Congress opted to avoid it when it passed the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Health Care Acr on March 23, 2010, and the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Ace just one week later ("PPACA" or the "Act", 
collectively). Currently 180 million Americans receive employer-sponsored health 
benefits, and millions more will do so once PPACA takes full effect over the next 
few years. This expansion of employer based coverage, coupled with what the Act 
does and does not do regarding the role of employers, makes ERISA preemption 
potentially more problematic than ever. Thus, to accomplish meaningful 
improvements in how employer-sponsored health benefits are financed and 
delivered, Congress must tackle ERISA preemption of state "play or pay" laws if it 
expects to improve instead of simply expand and exacerbate existing problems with 
employer coverage. 
The evolution of employer-sponsored health insurance and the pros and cons 
of "play or pay" mandates have been ably recounted elsewhere and will not be 
revisited here.4 What warrants further consideration is why employer mandates 
have been so difficult to implement at the state level. Obviously, there are 
numerous reasons for this, with fears of employer exodus from a state, lower 
wages, higher prices and job losses among them.5 Beyond the economic factors, 
though, lies a significant legal obstacle: ERISA preemption of state law. Spanning 
three decades and growing more complex with each year, ERISA preemption 
jurisprudence is often mentioned, but rarely explained in the context of employer 
mandates.6 Such confusion is likely to intensify with PPACA's passage since the 
1. E.g., PETER D. JACOBSON, O'NEILL INST. FOR NAT'L & GLOBAL HEALTH LAW, THE ROLE OF 
ERISA PREEMPTION IN HEALTH REFORM: OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITS, at iii (2009), available at 
http://www.rwjf.org/files/researchl39410.erisa.finall.pdf (describing ERISA preemption as one of the 
"eight pertinent issues" that must be addressed in any significant health reform proposal). 
2. Pub. L. No. II 1-148,124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
3. Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
4. See. e.g., David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States-
Origins and Implications, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 82-84 (2006) (describing the history of employer-
sponsored health insurance); Alan C. Monheit & Pamela Farley Short, Mandating Health Coverage/or 
Working Americans, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1989, at 22, 23-25 (discussing the benefits and criticisms of 
employer-based insurance mandates). 
5. See. e.g., MICHAEL J. CHOW & BRUCE D. PHILLIPS, NAT'L FED'N OF INDEP. Bus., SMALL 
BUSINESS EFFECTS OF A NATIONAL EMPLOYER HEALTHCARE MANDATE 2, 16 (2009), available at 
https:/lwww.nfib.com/PortalslOfPDFI AIIUserslNFIBStudy _HealthcareMandate.pdf (identifying 
increased costs, layoffs, and even closure as risks businesses may face under an employer mandate 
program). 
6. E.g., PATRICIA A. BUTLER, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., FACT SHEET: ERISA IMPLICATIONS 
FOR STATE PAY OR PLAY LAWS (2007), available at 
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Act includes an employer "play or pay" incentive, but is silent regarding the 
continued viability of existing state and local "play or pay" measures that require 
something more or different of employers in providing health benefits for their 
workers. 
With the goal of explaining how to head off a collision of PPACA and 
ERISA, this Article begins with an analysis of PPACA's treatment of employer 
responsibilities/ followed by a review of the mechanics of ERISA preemption.s It 
next examines recent state and local efforts to enact employer mandates and their 
mixed success in surviving ERISA preemption challenges, particularly those of 
Maryland, Massachusetts, and San Francisco.9 Finally, an evaluation of PPACA's 
potential impact on ERISA preemption of state "play or pay" provisions 
demonstrates why Congress must clarify the interaction of PPACA and § 514 of 
ERISA with regard to the intended role, if any, of state or local employer mandates 
in national reform. \0 Anything less perpetuates a major, but poorly understood 
obstacle to meaningful reform despite all that Congress accomplished in enacting 
PPACA. 
I. EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY UNDER PP ACA 
Enacting significant legislative reform in the United States can involve years 
of extended debate and substantial compromise. However, it took decades of failed 
attempts before Congress passed PP ACA. The final push proved especially 
contentious ll with charges of government takeovers l2 and death panels l3 diverting 
the spotlight from one typical lightning rod of controversy: the use of employer 
http://calhealthreform.org/pdfIERISAfactsheetButlerP.pdf (showing uncertain views regarding how 
ERISA affects "play or pay" laws); but see Timothy S. Jost, Health Care Reform Requires Law Reform, 
28 HEALTH AFF. w761, w762-{i3 (2009), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgilreprintl28/S/w761 
(discussing the areas in which ERISA preempts state law). 
7. See infra Part I. 
8. See infra Part II. 
9. See infra Parts III-V. 
10. See infra Part VI. 
II. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Remarks by the 
President to a Joint Session of Congress on Health Care (Sept. 9, 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_officelRemarks-by-the-President-to-a-Joint-Session-of-Congress-
on-Health-Care (imploring Congress to enact health care reform legislation); CNNPolitics.com, Obama 
Resumes Health Care Push, Vows to 'Get It Done This Year' (Sept. 27, 2009), 
http://www.cnn.coml2009/POLITICS/09/26/0bama.healthlindex.html. 
12. See, e.g., Matt Spetalnick, Reuters, Healthcare Critics Make Outlandish Claims: Obama (Aug. 
8, 2009), http://www.reuters.comlartic\e/idUSN0742097620090808 {"Republicans call [Obama's push 
for healthcare reform] a government takeover of health care .... "}. 
13. See Jim Rutenberg & Jackie Calmes, False 'Death Panel' Rumor Has Some Familiar Roots, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2009, at AI, available at http://www.nytimes.coml2009/08/14lhealthlpolicy/ 
14pane1.html (describing allegations that Obama's proposals for health care reform would result in 
government-sponsored "death panels"). 
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"play or pay" provisions to expand coverage and spread COSt.14 Typically, such 
"shared responsibility" measures either mandate or incentivize employers to "play" 
by sponsoring employee health benefits or "pay" via a "fair share" contribution 
(usually a tax or flat fee) to cover the uninsured in general or its own uncovered 
workers. IS 
Prior to PPACA's enactment, the federal Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) permitted an employer to do neither. 16 Whether this would 
change was a major point of disagreement between the two chambers of Congress. 
The House of Representatives' Affordable Health Care for America Act (H.R. 
3962),17 passed with a narrow margin of 220 to 215,18 and required employers with 
annual payrolls exceeding $500,000 to "play" by contributing 75.2% to employees' 
individual coverage or 65% to family coverage,19 or "pay" a payroll tax ranging 
from 2% to 8%, depending on the amount of that payroll.20 By a vote of 60 to 39 
along party lines/I the Senate voted to consider an amendment to the House bill 
(S.Amdt. 2786), which would have omitted the overt mandate that existed in the 
House measure.22 However, it did impose a substantial incentive in the form of a 
$750 "free rider" penalty that would be triggered when an employee of a large firm 
obtained federally subsidized coverage.23 
As Congress wrestled with this and the literally countless details of national 
reform, the business community displayed mixed reactions to an employer 
mandate. The National Retail Foundation viewed any "play or pay" scenario as 
14. See Monheit & Short, supra note 4, at 23 (describing employer mandates as a subject of 
continuing controversy). 
15. See Jeanne Sahadi, CNNMoney.com, Health Care: Will 'Payor Play' Chase Employers Away? 
(July 2, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/02/news/economylhealth_reform (explaining the latest 
iteration of a "play or pay" proposal that was included in a Senate proposal). 
16. 29 U.s.c. § I I 44(a) (2006). 
17. Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, III th Congo (2009). 
18. 155 CONGo REc. HI2,598, HI 2,967--68 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009). That most House Democrats 
supported and most Republicans opposed H.R. 3962 in general and the employer mandate in particular 
is nothing new. Employer mandates provoked a similar split during the Clinton administration's 
unsuccessful health reform initiative. Roger Thompson, Support WanesJor Employer Mandate-Health 
Care ReJorm Policy, NATION'S Bus., Aug. 1994, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/ 
mi_mI154/is_n8_v82/ai_15637930. The House Ways and Means Committee approved an employer 
mandate by a 20 to 18 vote, but not one Republican voted for it. Id. Once the Republican Revolution 
regained congressional control in November 1994, the employer mandate as well as health reform in 
general fell off the legislative agenda. See MARK E. RUSHEFSKY & KANT PATEL, POLITICS, POWER & 
POLICY MAKING: THE CASE OF HEALTH CARE REFORM IN THE 1990s \08 (1998) (indicating that in 
September 1994, Senate Majority Leader Mitchell declared the health care bill was dead). 
19. H.R. 3962 § 412(b)(\)(A)-{B). 
20. Id. § 413(a)-{b). 
21. 155 CONGo REc. S 13,834 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2009). 
22. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, S.Amdt. 2786, III th Congo (2009). 
23. Id. sec. 1513, § 4980H(a)(\), (d)(I). 
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"catastrophic" and "devastating.,,24 The National Federation of Independent 
Business opposed the imposition of significant costs on employers, especially small 
ones, at a time when unemployment was at a twenty-five-year high and the 
economy continued to struggle, despite the government's insistence that the 
recession was over.25 Republicans tended to agree,26 with Senator Orrin Hatch 
calling such measures "job killing.,,27 Yet, a struggling economy,28 growing health 
care cost pressures29 and shrinking coverage actually made "shared responsibility" 
more palatable for some employers, as evidenced by Wal-Mart's dramatic shift 
from vehement opponent to staunch supporter.30 Thus, by the close of 2009, the 
lack of strong consensus in the political and business sectors indicated that H.R. 
3962's "play or pay" provision could change considerably, or disappear entirely 
during the process of reconciliation and a full vote of both houses.31 
With PPACA's passage, however, "play or pay" lives on, albeit in still 
another permutation. Technically, it is not a true "mandate" since it does not 
require health-related payments in every instance (unlike the House's original 
unconditional insistence that employers sponsor benefits or pay additional taxes). 
Rather, the Act encourages employers to "play" through conditional "pay" 
penalties that only attach in certain circumstances. As such, it is more aptly 
characterized as an incentive than a mandate, although the term "employer 
mandate" is often applied to both strategies. 
Specifically, PPACA's version of "play or pay" will take effect in 2014 and 
covers "applicable large employers" who employed 50 or more full-time 
24. Letter from Tracy Mullin, Pres. & CEO, Nat'l Retail Fed'n, to members of the Nat'l Retail 
Fed'n (July 13, 2009), available at http://www.nrf.comlmodules.php?name=Documents&op= 
viewlive&sp_id=3358. 
25. Susan Eckerly, Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus., NFIB Statement: Senate Health Bill (Nov. 19,2009), 
http://www.nfib.comlissues-elections/issues-elections-itemlcmsidl50237. 
26. See John Boehner, The GOP's Job Creation Plan, WASH. POST, Dec. II, 2009, at A29 
(describing Republican opposition to increasing costs to employers). 
27. FOXNews.com, Will Democrats Go at It Alone on the Health Care Bill? (Aug. 20, 2009), 
http://www.foxnews.comlstory/0.2933.540941.00.html. 
28. See Eric Dash & Vikas Bajaj, In 2009, Economy Will Depend on Unlocking Credit, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2008, at BI (describing the continuing effect of the 2008 financial crisis on the current 
economy). 
29. E.g., Lisa Girion, Healthcare Costs Pinch Employers: Study Suggests That Manufacturers Have 
Limited Resources to Offset Rising Fees, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 2008, at C3. 
30. Letter from John Podesta, Pres. & CEO, CIT. for Am. Progress, Andrew L. Stem, Pres., Servo 
Employees Int'I Union, & Mike Duke, Pres. & CEO, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., to President Barack Obama 
(June 30, 2009), available at http://online.wsj.comlpublic/resourcesldocuments/walmarCletter_ 
063009t.pdf. 
31. Compare CHOW & PHILLIPS, NAT'L FED'N OF INDEP. BUS., supra note 5, at 2, 16 (describing 
how an employer mandate will harm the economy in general and small businesses in particular), with 
Thomas C. Buchmeuller & Alan C. Monheit, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance and the Promise of 
Health Insurance Reform, 46 INQUIRY 187, 195-96 (2009) (describing the positive outcomes of an 
employer mandate in Hawaii). 
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equivalents for more that 120 days in the preceding calendar year.32 These 
employers need not offer or contribute to premiums for minimum benefits, but they 
may choose to "play" by offering "minimum essential coverage" to full time 
employees and their beneficiaries.33 Such coverage must meet minimum 
requirements regarding the benefits themselves and be affordable; the employee's 
required contribution cannot exceed 9.5% of total household income or 40% of 
covered expenses. Automatic enrollment is required if the full-time workforce 
equals 200 or more, although employees can opt out of coverage.34 
Because PPACA creates an incentive, not a mandate, there is no consequence 
to a large employer that decides not to "play" unless and until one of its full-time 
employees becomes a "free rider" by receiving federally subsidized health care 
through a newly created, state-based health insurance exchange. Thus, a large 
employer that offers no coverage pays nothing at all if none of its full-time 
employees receives a federal premium credit or cost-sharing reduction to buy 
exchange-based coverage. Should one or more of its full-time workers do so, 
however, the employer will "pay" a stiff penalty in the form of a monthly excise 
tax equal to: 
(Number offull-time employees - 30) x ($2000112 or $166.67).35 
It is important to note that the fine is based on all full-time employees (minus the 
first 30), even if only one was a free rider. For an employer with 50 full-time 
workers, this would amount to $40,000 per year. A full-time workforce of 100 
would generate an annual penalty of $ 140,000. 
Employers that do offer coverage could face somewhat lighter penalties if one 
of its full-time employees receives a premium credit to buy exchange coverage. 
Such employers will pay the lesser of: 
(Number offull-time employees - 30) x ($2000112 or $166.67) 
-or-
32. Full-time equivalents, as opposed to full-time employees (averaging thirty or more hOUTS per 
week, determined on a monthly basis) are used to determine whether an employer is large enough to be 
subject to PPACA's "play or pay" requirements. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, § 1513(a) (2010) (amending 43 I.R.C. § 4980H) [hereinafter § 1513(a)]. However, only 
full-time employees are counted when calculating the Act's "pay" penalties. [d. §§ I 513(a), 10106(e), 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1003. 
33. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 15\3(a). The content and scope of essential 
benefits will be defined through future rule-making. 
34. See generally THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: DETAILED SUMMARY 3 
(20 I 0), available at http://dpc.senate.govlhealthreformbilllhealthbill95.pdf. 
35. [d. 
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(Number of full-time employees receiving premium credits for exchange 
converage) x ($3000/12 or $250).36 
There is no such penalty for employers that offer "free choice vouchers" that are 
then used by the employee to participate in a health exchange.37 After 2014, all 
penalty amounts will be adjusted annually.38 
Given the inherent complexity of PPACA's original "play or pay" language 
and subsequent reconciliation, its 2014 effective date, and the growing chorus of 
critics vowing to repeal the Act or at least litigate much of it away, it is not at all 
clear whether and to what extent employers will eventually play or pay. As 
discussed infra, several states already have "play or pay" requirements and many 
more were actively considering them, but put them on hold in the face of federal 
reform efforts.39 Moreover, one month prior to PPACA's enactment, the U.S. 
Department of Labor (DOL) submitted to the Office of Management and Budget a 
proposed rule to "clarify the circumstances under which certain health care 
arrangements established or maintained by state or local governments for the 
benefit of non-governmental employees do not constitute an employee welfare 
benefit plan" under § 505 of ERISA.40 Although the vague submission did not 
mention "play or pay" provisions explicitly and might simply be intended to 
address state health exchanges as opposed to mandatory contributions thereto, it 
unleashed a torrent of criticisms from industry groups that the DOL was about to 
exempt state or local fair share mandates from § 514 preemption.41 The National 
Benefits Council Steering Committee complained that the proposed rule "appears 
to move in exactly the opposite direction" ofPPACA's determination that "ERISA 
36. [d. 
37. PPACA requires large employers that offer coverage and pay a portion of its cost to provide 
the alternative of free choice vouchers to those full-time employees with incomes below 400% of the 
federal poverty level who would face an employee premium contribution of between S% and 9.S%. 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 101 OS(h)-{i) 
3S. See generally HINDA CHAIKIND & CHRIS L. PETERSON, CONGRESSIONAL REs. SERV., 
SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL EMPLOYER PENALTIES UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTOIN AND AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT (PPACA) (2010), available at http://www.ncsl.orgldocumentslhealthiEmployerPenalties.pdf. 
39. See infra Parts III-VI. 
40. Health Care Arrangements Established by State and Local Governements for Non-
Governmental Employees, 74 Fed. Reg. 64,275, 64,275-76 (Dec. 7, 2009) (proposing to amend 29 
C.F.R. 2510.3-1 pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1135). 
41. See, e.g., HR Policy Ass'n, DOL Proposed Regulation Would Create ERISA Preemption 
Carveout (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.hrpolicy.orglissues_story.aspx?GID=33&SID=3567&miid=3 
&msid=4 (implying that the rule's timing was intended to influence the U.S. Supreme Court's expected 
Fall 2010 resolution of Golden Gate Restaurant Ass'n v. City of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 
200S), petition for cert.filed, 130 S. Ct. 357 (June 5, 2009) (No. OS-ISIS), discussed infra Part V.C). 
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should remain intact and preserve the protection against a patchwork of different 
and conflicting municipal and state benefit plan requirements ... .'.42 
Of critical concern, therefore, is whether PPACA's "play or pay" measure 
sets a minimum floor above which states can require more of employers or instead, 
either immediately or as of 2014, preempts any state action along these lines. 
Through its silence on such matters, the Act casts a large and threatening shadow 
over the already perplexing impact of ERISA preemption on state health reform 
efforts. Thus, as explained below, the chronic problem of inconsistent judicial 
interpretation of ERISA preemption may now play an even larger role in derailing 
state efforts to impose employer mandates and jeopardize those that are already in 
existence.43 
II. A REvIEW OF ERISA's COMPLEX "PREEMPTION" CLAUSES 
A. Section 514 's "Relate to" Clause 
ERISA defines an "employee welfare benefit plan" as "any plan, fund, or 
program. .. established or maintained by an employer. . . through [which] the 
purchase of insurance or otherwise" provides various benefits, including health 
benefits.44 To protect plan administrators from the negative impact of unduly 
complicated and potentially contradictory state regulations that foster plan 
mismanagement and abuse, ERISA also contains a three-part preemption 
provision.45 Section 514(a) states that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State 
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to an employee benefit plan 
... .'.46 Section 514(b) then exempts or "saves" from preemption certain types of 
state laws, including state insurance laws.47 Subsection (b) clarifies, though, that 
states cannot "deem" a law to constitute insurance regulation for the purpose of 
"saving" a law that would otherwise "relate to" a plan and trigger "relate to" 
preemption.48 Because § 514 is "not a model of legislative drafting,'.49 each of its 
three clauses will be considered separately in an effort to dispel at least some of 
their inherent confusion. 
42. Andrew Jensen, Fight Over ERISA Preemption Moves to Courts, Regulators, ALASKA 1. 
COMMERCE, Apr. 9, 2010, http://www.alaskajoumal.comlstories/0409IOlIoc_I3_00I.shtml (quoting a 
letter from the National Coalition on Benefits to Peter Orszag, Director of the Office of Management 
and Budget, on March 15,2010). 
43. See infra Part II. 
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006). 
45. [d. § I I 44(a), (b)(2)(A)--(8). 
46. [d. § I I 44(a). State laws subject to possible preemption "include[] all laws, decisions, rules, 
regulations, or other State action having the effect oflaw, of any State." [d. § 1 1 44(c)(I). 
47. [d. § 1 1 44(b)(2)(A). 
48. [d. § 1 1 44(b)(2)(B). 
49. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 722, 740 (1985). 
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While § 514 supersedes a state law that "relates to" any employee benefit 
plan, it does not explain that term. In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,50 the U.S. 
Supreme Court offered the equally amorphous definition of having "a connection 
with or reference to" an ERISA plan-as long as such claims are not "too 
tenuous.,,5! In theory, a law makes a "reference" to a plan ifit explicitly mentions it 
or depends on its existence. 52 A "connection" occurs when a statute does not 
mention a benefits plan per se, but effectively regulates plans by restricting their 
choices or creating the threat of conflicting state requirements.53 
For example, in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
Plans v. Travelers Insurance CO.,54 § 514 did not preempt a generally applicable 
New York surcharge on hospital bills because it affected plans only indirectly and, 
therefore, did not target or regulate the plans themselves. 55 Nevertheless, the Court 
explained that "relate to" preemption can occur if such an indirect economic impact 
"force[s] an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage or 
effectively restrict[s] its choice of insurers .... ,,56 Apparently, altering a plan's 
incentives is fine, but dictating its choices is not.57 
B. Section 514 's "Saving" and "Deemer" Clauses 
A state law that relates to an employee benefit plan can still be "saved" from 
preemption if it regulates health insurance. In Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. 
Moran,58 an Illinois external review mandate for medical necessity determinations 
concerning employer-sponsored coverage related to a plan, but survived § 514 
preemption as a "saved" state insurance law. 59 Reconciling § 514' s broad "relate 
to" preemption with its broad reservation of state insurance oversight has proved 
difficult because "[ w ]hile Congress occasionally decides to return to the States 
50. 463 U.S. 85 (\983). 
51. Id. at 96-97, 100 n.21. 
52. See id. at 96-99 (stating that both the legislative intent and the Court's inclination are to read 
the tenn "relate to" as broadly as possible so as to work toward the goal of complete federal preemption 
of conflicting state laws). 
53. See Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001) (stating that "'connection with' is scarcely 
more restrictive than 'relate to'" and that the Court will "look to 'the objectives of the ERISA statute as 
a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress would survive,' as well as the nature of the effect of 
the state law on ERISA plans"). 
54. 514 U.S. 645 (1995). 
55. Id. at 668 (basing its holding on the fact that the statute in question only indirectly affected 
employee benefit programs and thus was not subject to ERISA preemption). 
56. Id. 
57. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 334 
(1997) (holding that the statute in question "aiter[ ed] the incentives, but [did] not dictate the choices" 
and thus was not related to an ERISA plan). 
58. 536 U.S. 355 (2002). 
59. 536 U.S. at 372-73. The "saving clause" exempts insurance, banking, or securities laws from 
preemption. 29 U.S.C. § I I 44(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
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what it has previously taken away, it does not nonnally do both at the same time.',6O 
Further complicating matters is § 514's "deemer" clause, which qualifies the saving 
clause that qualifies the "relate to" clause.61 Basically, a state law cannot evade 
"relate to" preemption simply by deeming a benefits plan as constituting an 
insurance plan if it would not otherwise qualify as one. Although § 514 does not 
define insurance, it is the reason why states can regulate insured, but not self-
insured plans-and also why finns increasingly self-insure to evade state 
oversight.62 
As if § 514 were not sufficiently confounding, ERISA offers an additional 
source and type of preemption through its § 502 civil enforcement scheme, which 
actually says nothing about displacing state law.63 According to the Supreme Court, 
however, § 502 is the sole means for enforcing ERISA and, thus, necessarily 
preempts state claims that threaten ERISA's exclusive federal oversight of plan 
administration.64 Consequently, a state law that escapes § 514 "relate to" or 
"conflict" preemption must also survive § 502 "complete" preemption.65 Not 
surprisingly, the textual complexity and ambiguity of § 514 and § 502 make this an 
extremely unstable area of the law. Due to the Supreme Court's expansive 
interpretations of both sections, § 514 preempted almost any state law that had any 
impact on employee health benefits plans in the 1980s and early 1990s.66 
Preemption narrowed in the mid-1990s67 but recent years show the Court returning 
60. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739-40 (1985); see also Rush Prudential, 
536 U.S. at 392 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the "relate to" and "saving" clauses are "almost 
antithetically broad"). 
61. § 1144(b )(2)(B). The "deemer clause" found in § 514 limits the "saving clause" by stating that 
an employee benefit plan covered by ERISA "shall [not] be deemed to be an insurance company or 
other insurer ... or to be engaged in the business of insurance ... for purposes of any law of any State 
purporting to regulate insurance companies [or] insurance contracts .... " Id. 
62. See id. § 1002 (lacking a definition of insurance); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52,61 
(1990) (discussing application of the "deemer" clause to insurance regulation); Kathlynn L. Butler, 
Comment, Securing Employee Health Benefits Through ERISA and the ADA, 42 EMORY L.J. 1197,1204 
n.41 (1993) (quoting Representative Wyden's statement that "[f]irms that are too small to successfully 
self-insure health plans are reorganizing to do just that, with the goal of escaping state oversight"). 
63. See § 1132 (omitting any explicit mention of preemption); Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The 
Savings Clause. § 502 Implied Preemption. Complete Preemption. and State Law Remedies, 42 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 105, 110-11 (2001) (describing § 502 as an implied preemption). 
64. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52-53 (1987). 
65. See Bogan, supra note 63, at 161-64 (discussing complete preemption and how it can convert a 
state law claim for relief into a federal cause of action). 
66. Lindsey Gastright Churchill, Note, Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran: Federal Intervention 
Looms as Supreme Court Rules That ERISA Does Not Preempt State Laws Requiring Independent 
Review of Medical Necessity Decisions and Lays Groundwork for Different Independent Review 
Provisions from All Fifty States, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 535, 564 (2002) (noting the court's trend of 
broadly interpreting ERISA preemption in the 1980s and early 1990s). 
67. See id. (noting that the Supreme Court moved away from its broad interpretation of preemption 
after the early I 990s). 
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to broad § 514 "relate to" or "conflict" preemption as well as § 502 "complete" 
preemption.68 
III. STATE "PLAY OR PA y" MANDATES 
ERISA does not require employers to offer health benefits, and prevents 
states from mandating that they do SO.69 At present, approximately 70% of private 
sector employees are covered by commercially insured or self-funded employer-
sponsored plans.70 With annual policy costs averaging $4,824 for individuals and 
$13,375 for families/I some 40% of private sector employers choose not to provide 
coverage.72 Over the past decade, 98% of large employers (i.e., employers with 
greater than 200 workers) have continued to offer coverage,73 while the percentage 
of small and mid-size firms (3 to 199 workers) offering coverage has dropped from 
68% in 2000 to 59% in 2009.74 Those that do offer health benefits contribute, on 
average, 83% of the total premium for their workers' individual coverage and 73% 
for family coverage.75 According to one pre-PPACA estimate, whether through loss 
of jobs or simply loss of benefits, 14,000 people become uninsured each day.76 This 
places additional financial burdens on already cash-strapped, "safety net" hospital 
emergency departments since most states only partially reimburse uncompensated 
care by using Medicaid payment rates. 77 
68. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 221 (2004) (holding that the state causes of 
action fell within § 502 and were removable to federal court); Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 
U.S. I, 8, 11 (2003) (applying complete preemption in allowing the removal of a case to federal court 
even when the complaint relies entirely on state law). For an extensive discussion of how the U.S. 
Supreme Court's inconsistent ERISA preemption jurisprudence has adversely affected health care in 
general, see Mary Ann Chirba-Martin, Drawing Lines in Shifting Sands: The U.S. Supreme Court's 
Mixed Messages on ERISA Preemption Imperil Health Care Reform, 36 NOTRE DAME. J. LEG. 91 
(2010). 
69. 29 U.S.c. § 1002 (2006) (indicating that benefit plans are not mandatory); id. § 1144 (stating 
that ERISA supersedes any state laws that relate to employee benefit plans). 
70. Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in the United States (July 28, 
2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ebs2.nrO.htm. 
71. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH 
BENEFITS: 2009 ANNUAL SURVEY 2 exhibit B (2009), available at http://ehbs.kff.orglpdf/2009/7936.pdf 
[hereinafter EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2009 SURVEY]. 
72. Id. at 38 exhibit 2.1. 
73. Id. at 38 exhibit 2.2. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 68 exhibit 6.1. 
76. CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND, HEALTH CARE IN CRISIS: 14,000 LOSING COVERAGE A 
DAY I (2009), http://www .americanprogressaction.orglissuesl2009/02/pdflhealth_care_crisis. pdf. 
77. See Teresa A. Coughlin & David Liska, Changing State and Federal Payment Policies for 
Medicaid Disproportionate-Share Hospitals, 17 HEALTH AFF. 118, 119 (1998) (noting that hospitals are 
only partially reimbursed for uncompensated care); Kevin N. Rask & Kimberly J. Rask, Public 
Insurance Substituting for Private Insurance: New Evidence Regarding Public Hospitals, 
Uncompensated Care Funds, and Medicaid, 19 J. HEALTH ECON. I, 2-3 (2000) (noting that hospitals 
are acting as a "safety net" for the uninsured). 
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With federal refonn efforts perennially stalled by congressional distraction 
and gridlock in recent years, states looked for their own solutions, and focused 
increasingly on the 40% of (mostly small) private sector employers that do not pay 
their "fair share" for their employees' uncompensated care. Vennont and 
Massachusetts have enacted "play or pay" requirements that, to date, have not been 
challenged as preempted by ERISA. 78 An additional fourteen states have attempted, 
or are at least considering similar measures.79 However, § 514's inherent 
complexity and its inconsistent judicial interpretations have clearly had a chilling 
effect on whether and how a state will pursue an employer mandate.so Accordingly, 
despite their promise as a way to expand and finance coverage, they have often 
been viewed as not worth the substantial costs of defending them against ERISA 
challenges.S! 
A. State Efforts to Create Employer "Play or Pay" Mandates 
Prior to PPACA, a number of states attempted to work around ERISA in 
trying to require or at least encourage employers to offer or contribute to employee 
health coverage.82 Most initiatives fell between inchoate ideas and near-final 
proposals, but some were actually voted on.83 Of those, most were voted down, but 
a few became law, including three that were challenged under § 514-with two 
succumbing to preemption and a third probably on its way to a similar fate. 84 
78. See infra Part V. 
79. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, HENRY 1. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., STATES 
MOVING TOWARD COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE REFORM (2009), available at 
http://www .kff.orgiuninsurediuploadiState-Health-Reform I.pdf. 
80. Cf Jane D. Bailey, ERISA Preemption, 74 DENV. U. L. REv. 473, 486-87 (1997) (noting that 
ERISA has proven frustrating to courts and is frequently litigated because of the complexity of the 
statute); Rebecca Entigar Nauta, ERISA Preempts Maryland's Fair Share Health Care Fund Act: The 
Chilling Effect on State Innovation in Health Care Cost-Sharing with Big Business, 35 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 756, 758 (2007) (predicting that judicial interpretation of § 514 cases, such as Retail Indus. 
Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007), will have a chilling effect on state action in 
encouraging employer-provided coverage). 
81. See PATRICIA A. BUTLER, NAT'L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, ERISA IMPLICATIONS 
FOR STATE HEALTH CARE ACCESS INITIATIVES: IMPACT OF THE MARYLAND "FAIR SHARE ACT" COURT 
DECISION 7-8, II (2006) (describing the difficulty states will have in defending "play or pay" laws). 
82. See KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 79, at 1-19 (noting states 
that have attempted to enact differing health legislation despite the possibility of ERISA preemption); 
Richard Cauchi, Nat'l Conf. of State Legs., States' Use of "Cafeteria Plans" to Provide Health 
Insurance, http://www.ncsl.orgl?tabid='14515 (last visited June II, 2010) (discussing state efforts to 
require employers to offer health coverage through the use of cafeteria plans). 
83. See KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 79, at 5,16,18 (discussing 
various state attempts at reform that have failed at different stages of the legislative process); id. at 3, 9, 
15, 17 (noting that Colorado, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Vermont have all implemented initiatives to 
expand health care access). 
84. See infra Parts IV-V (discussing federal preemption in Maryland and New York and the 
ongoing litigation in San Francisco). 
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B. Proposals and Initiatives 
Oregon recently enacted a number of reforms to finance expanded coverage 
by taxing hospitals and insurers.85 However, ERISA concerns led it to defer 
employer mandates for further study while urging Congress to "create 'safe harbor' 
policies for state health care reform elements (such as 'play or pay' payroll taxes) 
that would protect states from ERISA court challenges. ,,86 
New York's Partnership for Coverage Initiative contains four reform 
proposals modeled by the Urban Institute, with two relying on employer 
mandates. 87 The Health Plus plan would offer a state-run plan as an alternative to 
current employer sponsored private plans and levy non-capped payroll taxes of ten 
percent.88 A second proposal calls for as-yet-undetermined annual assessments on 
employers with ten or more employees to be offset by an employer's other 
contributions to employee health coverage.89 
In Pennsylvania, Governor Rendell's Prescription for Pennsylvania would 
impose a three percent "fair share tax" on the payrolls of employers that do not 
offer health coverage to their workers.90 A single payer proposal was recently filed 
in the state legislature that included a "fair share tax" equal to ten percent of gross 
payrol1.91 
In early 2007, the Illinois Health Care for All Act92 came before the state's 
General Assembly, but activity has since been suspended.93 The Act would require 
a "covered assessment" (a tax of three percent of annual wages up to a maximum of 
$7500 per employee) from employers with ten or more employees "for the 
85. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 79, at 15. 
86. OR. HEALTH FUND BD., AIM HIGH: BUILDING A HEALTHY OREGON: FINAL REpORT III (2008), 
available at http://www.oregon.gov/OHPPRlHFB/docs/FinaCReporcI12908.pdf. On June 26, 2009, 
H.B. 2009 took effect as Chapter 595 (2009 Laws). H.B. 2009, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); Oregon 
State Archives, Oregon Health Authority, http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/rules/OARS_90010AR_943/ 
943_001.html (last visited June 11,2010). 
87. COMM'R OF HEALTH & INS. SUPERINTENDENT, STATE OF N.Y. DEP'TS OF HEALTH & INS., 
REFORMS TO ACHIEVE QUALITY, AFFORDABLE COVERAGE FOR ALL NEW YORKERS 2, 5 (2009), 
available at http://partnership4coverage.ny.gov/reports/docs/2009-07-1 7 _release_oCurban_institute_ 
report.pdf. 
88. [d. at 5. 
89. [d. 
90. FAMILIESUSA, PENNSYLVANIA'S 2007 HEALTH CARE PROPOSAL: PRESCRIPTION FOR 
PENNSYLVANIA 5 (2007), available at http://www.familiesusa.orglassets/pdfs/state-expansion-pa.pdf. 
91. See H.R. 1660,2009 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009) (describing single payer plan); S. 400, 
2009 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009) (describing single payer plan). 
92. S. 5, 95th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (II. 2007). 
93. See Illinois General Assembly, Bill Status of SB0005, http://www.ilga.govllegislationl 
billstatus.asp?DocNum=5&DocTypeID=SB&GAID=9&SessionID=5l (last visited June II, 2010) 
(noting suspension as of January 2009); see also John Bouman & Jennifer Hrycyna, Caro v. 
B1agojevich: What Happens When Working Families' Health Care Becomes a Political Football, 42 
CLEARINGHOUSE REv.: 1. POVERTY L. & POL'y 615, 616 n.ll (2009) (noting that the Illinois Senate 
"never voted on the Illinois Health Care for All Act"). 
406 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 13:393 
privilege of doing business in [Illinois] .... ,,94 Employers spending 2.5% or more 
of wages on health benefits could offset that amount with tax credits.95 The bill 
expressly precludes employers from collecting that amount from their employees.96 
In 2008, the New Mexico state legislature rejected the Health Solutions for 
New Mexico Act.97 It would have required employers with as few as six employees 
and eventually all employers to make "work force fund" contributions equaling the 
difference between $500 per full-time worker (and $250 per part-time worker) and 
any other payments toward employee health care that were less than $500 ($250).98 
California's 2007 Health Care Security and Cost Reduction Act99 pursued 
universal coverage by imposing "shared responsibility" on: 1) individuals to obtain 
coverage; 2) the government to ensure the availability of affordable coverage, 
including subsidizing coverage for those who could not otherwise afford it; and 3) 
employers to offer § 125 cafeteria plans, and either "play" by covering their 
workers directly or "pay" in the form of a state payroll tax. IOO The nature and 
amount of the employer mandate was the subject of extensive negotiations between 
Governor Schwarzenegger and Democratic members of the state legislature. lol The 
final version called for a wage tax ranging from 1 % to 6.5% depending on the size 
of the firm's payroll. 102 After passing in the General Assembly, it quickly derailed 
in the Senate Finance Committee once the non-partisan Legislative Analyst's 
Office projected that, within five years, the plan's unstable financing mechanisms 
and lack of cost controls could increase the state's already-mounting deficit by as 
much as $1.5 billion. 103 
IV. ERISA PREEMPTION IN MARYLAND AND SUFFOLK COUNTY, NEW YORK 
With an eye toward the threat of ERISA preemption, Maryland enacted an 
extremely limited employer "play or pay" provision in its Fair Share Health Care 
94. S.5 §§ 50-301, -401. 
95. Id. § 50-302. 
96. Id. § 50-301(c). 
97. H.R. 62, 48th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2008); KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, 
supra note 79, at 13. 
98. H.R. 62 §§ 3, 12. 
99. Assem. 1,2007 Leg., 1st Extra. Sess. (Cal. 2007). 
100. Id. 
101. Jordan Rau, Some Steps, No Leaps on Healthcare; Legislators Vote to Curb Extreme Practices, 
but Such Key Issues as Cost and Uneven Care Are Unaddressed, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2008, at BI 
(discussing the piece-meal manner of enacting health reforms because of aggressive lobbying). 
102. Assem. I § 82(d). 
103. Letter from Elizabeth G. Hill, Leg. Analyst, Leg. Analyst's Office, to the Hon. Don Perata, 
Pres. Pro Tempore, Cal. Senate (Jan. 22, 2008), available at http://www.lao.ca.govI20081hIthl 
health_reformlhealth_reform_O I 2208.aspx. 
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Fund ACt. I04 It applied to four employers with 10,000 or more workers, but 
effectively targeted the only one that fell short of the statutory spending 
requirement: Wal-Mart, which was already under fire for being the nation's largest 
employer and failing to cover thousands of its employees. lOS Maryland's new law 
required Wal-Mart to meet various reporting requirements and devote at least eight 
percent of its total payroll to employee health care expenses. 106 It could do the latter 
by providing benefits directly or paying the difference between eight percent and its 
current health expenditures to the state's Medicaid fund. 107 
Before the law could take effect, it was invalidated by the Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit in Retail Industry Leaders Ass 'n v. FieiderlO8 as being § 514 
"relate to" preempted. 109 Wal-Mart itself did not sue; instead, the Retail Industry 
Leaders Association (RILA) led the charge by arguing that the "fair share" 
requirement violated ERISA's § 514 "relate to" clause. IIO Maryland countered that 
it was a generally applicable revenue statue like the one that survived § 514 
preemption in Travelers. III The trial and appellate courts agreed with RILA, 
104. Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, ch. 1,2006 Md. Laws I (codified at MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & 
EMPL. §§ 8.5-101 to -107 (West 2006), invalidated by Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 
180, 198 (4th Cir. 2007»; see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Maryland's "Wal-Mart" Act: Policy and 
Preemption, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 847, 847--49 (2006) (providing general background on the impetus 
for and content of Maryland's Fair Share Act). 
105. See Andrew A. Green, Health Bill Is Up for Debate: At Conference, Firms Suppon Wal-Mart 
Law Veto, Top Democrats Vow to Override It, BALT. SUN, Oct. 28, 2005, at IB (reporting that a Wal-
Mart official had acknowledged that criticisms about the company's health care policies were valid and 
that many Wal-Mart employees were uninsured or receiving public assistance); Susan Parker, Editorial, 
Our View-Fair Share Health Care Act, DAILY TIMES (Salisbury, Md.), July 23,2006, at 12 (noting that 
the law was known as the "Wal-Mart law" because it would have only impacted Wal-Mart); Ann 
Zimmerman, Wal-Mart to Stock Emergency-Contraception Pill, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2006, at A6 
("Wal-Mart faces rising criticism around the country for offering relatively bare-bones health benefits 
for its workers."). At the time the Maryland law was enacted, three other companies employing more 
than 10,000 workers operated in Maryland. Dan Rodricks, Politicians, Listen Up-The Public Has 
Spoken, BALT. SUN, July 16,2006, at lB. Wal-Mart was the only company of the four large employers 
who did not already "pay [its] fair share or more." Id. 
106. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-102 to -104 (requiring reports on health care 
spending for qualified employers, and that eight percent of the sum of all total wages must be spent on 
health insurance). 
107. Id. § 8.5-104(b); see also Zelinsky, supra note 104, at 848--49 (discussing Maryland's Fair 
Share Act). 
108. 435 F. Supp. 2d 481,501 (D. Md. 2006), afJ'd, 475 F.3d 180, 197-98 (4th Cir. 2007). Although 
Maryland's bill never had legal effect, some suggest that it nevertheless compelled Wal-Mart to improve 
the health care options it provided for its employees. Andrew A. Green, Wal-Mart Bill Is Celebrated, 
Despite Ruling; Backers Say It Pressured Retailer to Improve Employee Health Plans, BALT. SUN, July 
21,2006, at lB. 
109. Fielder, 475 F.3d at 197 (holding the Act has a "connection with" ERISA plans and, 
accordingly, is preempted). 
110. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 485-86, 493-94 & n.B (discussing RILA's standing and claim 
before the court). 
Ill. Fielder, 475 F.3d at 195 (citing N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,658-59 (1995». 
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reasoning that, despite the "pay" option, the eight percent spending provision was a 
benefits mandate, and the reporting requirements interfered with plan 
administration. 112 In each respect, the statute threatened § 514' s goal of uniform 
plan administration by requiring Wal-Mart to "keep an eye on conflicting state and 
local minimum spending requirements and adjust its heaIthcare spending [and 
recordkeeping] accordingly.,,113 Since this "connection" with a plan triggered 
"relate to" preemption, the court saw no need to determine whether an improper 
"reference" also existed. I 14 Within the year, a similar fair share mandate (this time a 
county ordinance) was preempted on similar grounds in Retail Industry Leaders 
Ass 'n v. Suffolk County. I IS 
V. WHAT REMAINS: MASSACHUSETTS, VERMONT, AND SAN FRANCISCO-
BUT FOR How LONG? 
A. Massachusetts' "Health Care for All" Statute 
In drafting and negotiating the various bills that ultimately emerged as 
PP ACA, congressional leaders relied heavily on what Massachusetts had already 
accomplished-and Massachusetts did so by deliberately avoiding Maryland's 
narrow strategy. Massachusetts' Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, 
112. [d. at 194-95. For the trial court's reasoning as it relates to plan administration, see Fielder, 435 
F. Supp. 2d at 494-95. 
lB. Fielder, 475 F.3d at 197; see also Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 496 ("[T]he Act violates ERISA's 
fundamental purpose of permitting multi-state employers to maintain nationwide health and welfare 
plans .... "); Matthew Dolan et aI., Court Voids "Wal-Mart Law"; U.S. District Judge Says Md. 
Violated Federal Authority, BALT. SUN, July 20, 2006, at IA (indicating that Maryland's Fair Share Act 
was invalidated by the Fourth Circuit because it violated federal law requiring uniform treatment of 
employers by requiring Wal-Mart to submit reports regarding its health care expenditures while other 
employers in the state were not so required); Editorial, The Wal-Mart Decision, BALT. SUN, July 21, 
2006, at 12A (reporting that the limitations ERISA places on states' ability to regulate the benefit plans 
offered by employers proved fatal to the legislation). 
114. Fielder, 475 F.3d at 192 n.2 (noting that neither the Circuit Court nor the District Court found it 
necessary to reach the "reference" question as both courts found preemption through the "connection" 
language). The Fourth Circuit noted, however, that the "reference to" standard applies more narrowly in 
preempting state law. [d. 
115. 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 416-17 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). With reporting obligations that mirrored 
Maryland's, the ordinance again targeted Wal-Mart by requiring large, non-unionized retailers to make 
annual health care expenditures equal to the "public health care cost rate" for each full- or part-time 
employee. [d. at 416; see SUFFOLK COUNTY, N.Y., REGULATORY LOCAL LAW §§ 325-1 to -6 (Sept. 27, 
2005), available at http://legis.suffolkcountyny.gov/resos2005/iI903-05.htm (detailing annual reporting 
requirements for covered employers); Ross Daly, Federal Judge Tosses Suffolk County's Health-
Coverage Law, LONG ISLAND Bus. NEWS (Long Island, N.Y.), July 27, 2007 (reporting that a U.S. 
District Court judge ruled that Suffolk County's fair share law was preempted by federal law and that 
"[t]he arrival of Wal-Mart ... was a motivating factor" for law's creation); Julia C. Mead, Suffolk 
Requires Big Stores to Help with Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 28, 2005, at B5 (indicating that Suffolk 
County's Fair Share for Health Care Act was aimed at retailers like Wal-Mart and noting that employers 
covered by the law would be required to contribute a minimum of $3 for each hour worked to an 
employee's health coverage). 
2010] ERISA PREEMPTION OF STATE "PLAY OR PAY" MANDATES 409 
Accountable Healthcarel16 took effect in 2007 with the goal of achieving universal 
coverage by 2009. 117 Unlike Maryland's focus on getting Wal-Mart to play or pay, 
Massachusetts foreshadowed PPACA's formulation of "shared responsibility" by 
imposing an array of requirements on insurers, individuals, and certain 
employers.118 For example, employers of more than ten full-time workers must 
make a "reasonable contribution" to employee health care by: 1) providing health 
benefits to at least twenty-five percent of the workforce; 2) paying at least a third of 
the cost of all workers' individual plans; or 3) making an annual "fair share" 
contribution, which, in 2008, was up to $295 per full-time worker. 119 Firms must 
also offer § 125 cafeteria plans or face "free rider" penalties. 120 In Massachusetts, 
then, employers can choose which type of payment to make, but some form of 
payment is still mandated. This distinguishes it from PPACA's use of an incentive 
that predicates the need to "pay" on the actual occurrence of free riding employees 
(in terms of basic coverage as opposed to § 125 plans). 
116. Act of Apr. 12, 2006, ch. 5S, 2006 Mass. Acts, available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/ 
seslaw06/sI060058.htm. 
117. See Richard Knox, Romney's Mission: Massachusetts Health Care (Apr. S, 2006), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5330S54 (noting the goal of the legislation is to 
provide health insurance to virtually every citizen by 2009). 
liS. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. liSE § 9A (West 200S); COMMONWEALTH CONNECTOR, 
EMPLOYER HANDBOOK I (2007), available at https:llwww.mahealthconnector.org/portal/binary/ 
com.epicentric.contentmanagement.servlet.ContentDeliveryServletlFindlnsurancelEmployer/Overviewl 
Employer%2520Handbook.pdf ("The guiding principle behind this refonn is one of shared 
responsibility."). Located within the Massachusetts bill is the newly created Commonwealth Health 
Insurance Connector, which assists individuals and small businesses with less than fifty employees to 
find suitable private plans and promote consumer driven competition. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176Q 
§ I (West Supp. 2009); COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., HEALTH CARE ACCESS AND AFFORDABILITY 
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REpORT I (2006), available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/summary.pdf.To 
date, the greatest criticism of the individual mandate is that it may not be economically sustainable since 
it is feared that premiums will be too high for the insured, too low for the insurer, and therefore require 
too much in the way of state subsidies. E.g., Alice Dembner, Healthcare Cost Increases Dominate Mass. 
Budget Debate: Controlling Them Said Key to Keeping Universal Coverage, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 26, 
200S, at A12, available at http://www.boston.com!news/locallarticles/200S/03/26lhealthcare3osC 
increases_dominate_mass_budgeCdebatel?page=full. 
119. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149 § ISS(b)--{d) (West Supp. 2009); see also COMMONWEALTH 
CONNECTOR,supra note liS, at 2-3 (summarizing the statutory requirements). 
120. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149 § ISS; id. ch. 151F § 2; see also COMMONWEALTH 
CONNECTOR, supra note liS, at S (explaining when the Free Rider Surcharge applies under the 26 
U.S.C. § 125 plan). Free rider penalties, ranging from 10% to 100% of the cost of the services, for 
failing to offer Section 125 plans to employees will be used to pay for uncompensated care sought by 
that employer's workers on five or more occasions. See Robert E. Moffit & Nina Owcharenko, 
Understanding Key Parts of the Massachusetts Health Plan, HERITAGE FOUND., Apr. 20, 2006, 
available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCAre/wml045.cfrn. Because § 125 Plans permit 
pre-tax employee contributions, they may offer savings of up to 40% of each employee dollar 
contributed, saving employers about $160 in annual federal withholding tax for each participating 
employee, despite the fact that it costs about $100 a year per employee to create and administer a health-
only cafeteria plan and that several national companies compete for this business. See Cauchi, supra 
note S2. 
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Initially, the cost of health refonn in Massachusetts raised concerns that small 
and medium-sized businesses would leave the state. 121 A contravening worry was 
that the fair share contribution was so low that it would lead employers to drop 
coverage. 122 Initial data show that neither has occurred-at least not yet. 
Approximately 70% of Massachusetts employers offered health benefits from 2001 
through 2005. 123 Notwithstanding escalating costs, this figure rose to 72% when the 
employer mandate took effect in 2007 even though nationally, employer coverage 
fell from 68% in 2001 to about 60% in 2007. 124 
Massachusetts' health care reform law has attracted attention not only 
because of its innovative approach, but also because of the broad political support 
for its enactment. 125 That employers backed it from the start and continue to stand 
by it is obviously essential to its financial sustainability.126 However, employer 
support is just as crucial for its "legal" sustainability insofar as it has escaped the 
kinds of ERISA challenges that occurred in Maryland, Suffolk County, and, as 
explained below, San Francisco. 
For at least three reasons, however, Massachusetts' "play or pay" provision 
has always been more vulnerable to § 514 preemption than its Maryland and 
Suffolk County predecessors, and PPACA's enactment makes its longtenn 
prospects even more tenuous. First, Massachusetts' imposition of more 
121. See Nina Owcharenko & Robert E. Moffit, The Massachusetts Health Plan: Lessons for the 
States, BACKGROUNDER, 1uly 18, 2006, at 7-8 (noting that the costs of an employer mandate could 
make it difficult for the start-up and maintenance of small businesses); Ryan Menard, Bill Offers Family 
Leave with Pay: Chamber, Union Leaders Differ on Plan; Employee Premiums Would Fund It, PATRIOT 
LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.), Apr. 24, 2006, at 9 (voicing concern that businesses considering relocating to 
Massachusetts might now look elsewhere). 
122. See 1effrey Krasner, Business Leader Suggests Health Law Too Easy on Firms, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 2, 2007, at C1 (noting that most employers provide a 50% to 80% premium contribution, 
far more than the 33% required by the fair share plan to avoid assessments). To forestall such a result, 
one bill has already been submitted that would exempt companies to pay for at least 50% of individual 
premiums to avoid paying the $295 employee insurance fee. S. 661, 185th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 
2007); Krasner, supra. 
123. DIV. OF HEALTH CARE FIN. & POL'y, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
HEALTH CARE IN MASSACHUSETTS: KEy INDICATORS 4 (2009) (providing an overview of health care 
statistics in Massachusetts, including data which shows that 68% to 70% of Massachusetts employers 
offered health insurance to their employees in 2001, 2003, and 2005), available at 
http://www .mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/dhcfp/r/pubsl09/key _indicatoTS_02-09.pdf. 
124.Id. 
125. See, e.g., Gillian K. SteelFisher et a\., Physicians' Views of the Massachusetts Health Care 
Reform Law-A Poll, 361 NEW ENG. 1. MED. e39(I), e39(I) (2009), available at 
http://content.nejm.orglcgilreprintlNElMp090985I.pdf?ssource=hcrc (stating that U.S. policymakers are 
looking to Massachusetts's health care plan as a potential model for health care reform). 
126. See Robert 1. Blendon et al., Massachusetts Health Reform: A Public Perspective from Debate 
Through Implementation, HEALTH AFF., Oct. 28, 2008, at w556, w564 (reviewing a four stage public 
opinion study that relayed information about the implementation and impact of the new health reform 
law in Massachusetts); Press Release, Health Affairs, Massachusetts Businesses Express Support for 
Health Care Reform Objectives: Survey Reveals Few Signs That Public Subsidies Are Crowding Out 
Private Coverage (Nov. 14,2007), available at http://www.healthaffairs.orglpresslnovdec0705.htm. 
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requirements on all employers with eleven or more workers risks antagonizing far 
more firms than just Wal-Mart. Second, the mandate to "pay something" through 
coverage or an annual fair share contribution might be viewed as an effective 
benefits mandate and/or administrative interference amounting to a § 514 
preempted "connection" with a plan. Third, although the Internal Revenue Service 
does not categorize § 125 plans as ERISA plans per se, their compulsory inclusion 
may constitute a § 514 preempted benefits mandate and/or plan interference, 
especially given their attendant financial and administrative costs. 127 In response to 
an ERISA challenge, the state could argue that the law actually creates options, not 
mandates, and that any payments make the law a funding measure with the kind of 
indirect economic impact that evaded § 514 preemption in Travelers. Whether this 
argument would prevail is unclear. Its failure in Fielder and Suffolk County and 
early success in San Francisco's litigation l28 only underscores the unfortunate 
reality that when it comes to ERISA preemption litigation, anything can happen. 
So far, employers have not challenged Massachusetts' law but their support 
may erode should health care costs, including fair share contributions and free rider 
penalties, continue to climb. The fault lines may already be forming. Recent 
budgetary constraints led the state to scale-back coverage for 30,000 legal 
immigrants and reduce reimbursements for "safety net" hospitals.1 29 This led 
Boston Medical Center, the state's largest provider of uncompensated care, to sue 
the state for violating its health reform statute, with more hospitals threatening to 
do the same.130 While not an ERISA case, it could be a sign of eroding support 
among other stakeholders-including employers. 
127. One analysis explains: 
[B]ecause the definition of employer group health coverage is different under ERISA than 
under the federal tax code, as long as employers do not endorse or promote specific 
individually purchased health insurance policies, [§ 125 plans] ... should not be subject to 
ERISA. Nor should a state requirement that employers offer [§] 125 plans be preempted by 
ERISA. 
PATRICIA A. BUTLER, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., EMPLOYER CAFETERIA PLANS: STATES' LEGAL AND 
POLICY ISSUES 2 (2008), available at http://www.chcf.org/resources/download.aspx?id=%7b0973EF72-
I F9C-4985-8D60-DA35B4 I 875 I E%7d. However, the National Conference of State Legislatures points 
out that "states still cannot regulate 'self-insured' health plans sponsored by many large employers" and 
that "[d]rafters need to recognize that care is needed to avoid a challenge to any broader law." Cauchi, 
supra note 82. 
128. See infra Part V.c. 
129. Abby Goodnough, Massachusetts Takes a Step Backfrom Health Care/or All, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 15,2009, at AIO; see also Carla K. Johnson, Will Safety Net Hospitals Survive Health Reform?, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS FIN. WIRE, Sept. 8, 2009 (critiquing Massachusetts's decision to eliminate health 
care coverage for legal immigrants in hopes of closing the state's growing deficit). 
130. Wendy E. Parmet, Litigation Amidst Reform-The Boston Medical Center Case, 361 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1819, 1819-21 (2009) (evaluating Boston Medical Center's recent challenge in state court 
questioning Massachusetts's Medicaid reimbursement protocol). 
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B. Vermont's "Catamount" Plan 
Vermont's "Catamount" Plan,131 passed in 2006, also expects employers to 
share the responsibility of financing universal coverage. 132 Employers with 
uninsured workers must make a quarterly health care premium contribution of $1 
per day for each full time equivalent employee ($365 per year), but there are no 
free rider penalties for noncompliance. 133 As in Massachusetts, Vermont's 
mandatory employer contribution has not yet provoked an ERISA challenge, but it 
may share the same vulnerabilities as the Massachusetts statute. 
C. San Francisco's Mandate-A Preemption Survivor or Merely on Life Support? 
Undaunted by the demise of Maryland and Suffolk County's fair share 
mandates, San Francisco passed its own "play or pay" measure: the San Francisco 
Health Care Security Ordinance. 134 It was immediately challenged but the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals surprisingly found no § 514 preemption in Golden Gate 
Restaurant Ass 'n v. City of San Francisco. 135 
The Ordinance applies to for-profit employers doing business in the city with 
an average of twenty "covered" employees per quarter, as well as to nonprofit 
employers that average fifty such workers. 136 These employers must make quarterly 
"required health care expenditures" equal to the total number of hours paid for each 
covered worker multiplied by an annual "health care expenditure rate.,,137 The City 
131. Act of May 2S, 2006, 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves 190 (amending 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves 
191). 
132. See James Maxwell, Interview, Comprehensive Health Care Reform in Vermont: A 
Conversation with Governor Jim Douglas, HEALTH AFF., Oct. 16, 2007, at w697, w699 (relaying the 
Vermont governor's participation in and opinions on the state's comprehensive health reforms 
implemented in 2006). 
133. See Harry Chen, Representative, House Health Care Committee, Presentation at the Council of 
State Governments: Eastern Regional Conference Annual Meeting: Vermont Health Care Reform 
"Catamount Health" (Aug. I, 2006), available at http://www.csgeast.org/Annual_Meeting/2006! 
healthchen.ppt. 
134. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE §§ 14.1-.8 (2006), available at http://library.municode.coml 
index.aspx?c1ientld= 14131 &stateld=S&stateName=California (follow "Chapter 14" hyperlink); see also 
Groundbreaking City Health Care Plan Passes in s.F., SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (San Jose, Cal.), July 
19, 2006 (detailing the history and unanimous passage of the Health Care Security Ordinance). The 
Ordinance created a city-administered health care program called the Health Access Plan, now formally 
entitled Healthy San Francisco but still referred to as HAP. Samuel C. Salganik, What the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Can Teach Us About ERISA Preemption: Is It Possible to 
Consistently Identify "Coercive" Pay-or-Play Schemes?, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 1482, 1504 & n.ISO. To 
be eligible for HAP coverage, an employee must reside in the city, be uninsured, and have a low or 
moderate income, although ineligible employees may be entitled to establish medical reimbursement 
accounts with the City. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 14.2(a)-(d). 
135. 546 F.3d 639, 642-43 (9th Cir. 2008),petitionforcert.jiled, 130 S. Ct. 3S7 (June S, 2009) (No. 
08-IS15). 
136. § 14. I (b)(3), (11)-(12) (defining covered employers). 
137. Id. §§ 14.I(b)(2)-(12), .3(a). Covered employees must "(I) work in the City, (2) work at least 
ten hours per week, (3) have worked for the employer for at least ninety days, and (4) are not excluded 
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has a right to inspect the employer's quarterly expenditure records. 138 
Noncompliance with recordkeeping requirements raises a presumption of 
nonpayment that can only be rebutted with clear and convincing evidence. 139 Under 
certain circumstances, the spending requirement also applies to self-funded plans, 
although they are exempt from tracking their per-employee expenditures. 14o The 
early indications are that San Francisco's employer mandate has not produced job 
losses and has reduced the number of uninsured from 82,000 to less than 23,000.141 
Mandating quarterly payments based on each worker's hours and variable 
health expenditure rates, and requiring that quarterly records of those payments be 
kept and made accessible is more burdensome than the fair share measures that 
triggered § 514 "relate to" preemption in Fielder and Suffolk County. 142 
Furthermore, § 514 has previously preempted potentially conflicting state and local 
directives and here, this potential was already reality given Maryland's and Suffolk 
from coverage by other provisions of the Ordinance." Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n, 546 F.3d at 644. At the 
time of the Ninth Circuit's ruling, the per employee health care expenditure was $1.17 per hour for for-
profit employers with twenty to ninety-nine employees and non-profit employers with fifty or more 
employees, and $1.76 per hour for for-profit employers with 100 or more workers.ld. (citing OFFICE OF 
LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT, CITY & COUNTY OF S.F., REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE 
EMPLOYER SPENDING REQUIREMENT OF THE SAN FRANCISCO HEALTH CARE SECURITY ORDINANCE 
(HCSO) 13 (2007), available at http://sfgsa.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=1246). 
138. § 14.3(b)(i). 
139. ld. § 14.3(b)(ii). 
140. See Golden Gate Rest. Ass 'n, 546 F.3d at 645 ("An employer providing 'health coverage to 
some or all of its covered employees through a self-fundedlself-insured plan' will 'comply with the 
spending requirement ... if the preceding year's average expenditure rate per employee meets or 
exceeds the applicable expenditure rate' for the employer."). 
141. Brief for Respondent at 6, Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City of San Francisco, No. 08-1515 (9th 
CiT. Aug. 24, 2009); ARINDRAJIT OUBE ET AL., INST. FOR RESEARCH ON LABOR & EMPLOYMENT, THE 
IMPACT OF SAN FRANCISCO'S EMPLOYER HEALTH SPENDING REQUIREMENT: INITIAL FINDINGS FROM 
THE LABOR AND PRODUCT MARKETS 1-2 (2009), available at http://www.irle.berkeley.edulcwedl 
wp/sfhealth_09.pdf (indicating that the ordinance has not yet resulted in the substantial job losses some 
worried might occur); Heather Knight, Health Plan Did Not Hurt City Jobs, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 21, 
2009, at 01 (reporting that, due to the ordinance, seventy-five percent of San Francisco's 60,000 
previously uninsured residents now have access to health care). 
142. Compare S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 14.3(a)--{b) (requiring a covered employer to "make 
required health care expenditures ... each quarter" and to "maintain accurate records of health care 
expenditures, required health care expenditures, and proof of such expenditures made each quarter each 
year, and allow OLSE reasonable access to such records"), with MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-
I03(a)(I) (West 2006) (requiring a covered employer to annually submit forms indicating the number of 
people it employed, the amount spent by the employer on health insurance, and the percentage of payroll 
the employer spent on health insurance), and SUFFOLK COUNTY, N.Y., REGULATORY LOCAL LAW 
§ 325-3(E) (Sept. 27, 2005), available at http://legis.suffolkcountyny.gov/resos2005/iI903-05.htm 
(requiring an employer to "(I) maintain accurate records for each employee's ... hours worked ... ; (2) 
permit employees ... access to records ... for inspection and copying; and (3) maintain accurate 
records of the covered employer's health care expenditures each year"). 
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County's similarly intended, but differently designed "play or pay" mandates. 143 
Thus, Golden Gate presented an even stronger case for preemption than had existed 
in Maryland and Suffolk County. 
Yet, a panel of three appellate judges from the Ninth Circuit saw things quite 
differently. It reasoned that, as explained in Travelers, any preemption inquiry 
should begin with a strong presumption against preemption, especially in an area 
traditionally controlled by state law, such as health care. l44 In its opinion, the 
presumption prevails here, since the employer spending requirement has no 
improper connection with an employee benefits plan, primarily because it provides 
options for satisfying it. 145 Payments can be directed toward the benefits themselves 
or be paid to the City.146 Such a "meaningful alternative" protects employers from 
having to establish or restructure existing plans, although they may elect to do 
SO.147 Moreover, if an employer chooses to pay for benefits directly, the Ordinance 
does not restrict how those dollars are used. 148 
According to the court, the "City-payment" option also shows that the 
Ordinance does not mandate creation of an ERISA plan,149 interfere with 
administration of existing plans,150 or bind plan administrators to particular 
choices. 151 Any administrative obligations fall on the employer, not the plan, 
indicating that the Ordinance also fails to expose plans to the kind of conflicting 
directives that ERISA preemption is designed to prevent. 152 As a result, there is no 
§ 514 preempted "connection.,,153 An impermissible "reference" to a plan is absent, 
too, because the Ordinance neither targets ERISA plans nor depends on their 
existence. 154 
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit in Golden Gate found no conflict with the 
Fourth Circuit's Fielder ruling. 155 The Ninth Circuit interpreted Maryland's "play 
or pay" statute as forcing Wal-Mart to play since opting to pay the state returned 
143. See Peter D. Jacobson, The Role oj ERISA Preemption in Health Reform: Opportunities and 
Limits, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 88, 100 app. A (2009), for a side-by-side comparison of the Maryland 
and San Francisco measures. 
144. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n, 546 F.3d at 647 (citing N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 661 (1995». 
145. Id. at 655-57. 
146. Id. at 655-56. 
147. Id. at 646, 660. 
148. Id. at 646-47. 
149. Id. at 650. 
I SO. Id. at 653-54. 
151. Id. at 656. 
152. Id. at 657. 
153. Id. at 661. 
154. Id. at 657. 
155. Id. at 659. 
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nothing but "lower employee morale and increased public condemnation.,,156 Under 
this interpretation, Maryland's law related to plan administration in violation of § 
514 because Wal-Mart's only "rational choice" was to play by establishing or 
altering an ERISA plan. 15? In "stark contrast," San Francisco's City-payment option 
offers "a meaningful alternative" to employers since their workers can enroll in the 
City-run plan or establish medical reimbursement accounts with the City.158 The 
court reasoned that this permits employers to fulfill the spending requirements 
without having "to alter or establish ERISA plans .... ,,159 
The Ninth Circuit denied the Restaurant Association's petition for en bane 
review by the full panel of eighteen judges. 160 However, eight judges would have 
reheard the case because they identified a circuit split with the Fourth Circuit in 
Fielder and thought that Fielder got it right. 161 In their view, the three judge Golden 
Gate panel ran afoul of the Supreme Court's ruling in Egelhoff v. Egelho.t/62 
because the Ordinance "effectively requires 'ERISA administrators to master the 
relevant laws of 50 States'" despite ERISA's insistence on uniform, federal 
oversight of plan administration. 163 The payment, record-keeping, and inspection 
obligations forges "an impermissible connection with ... ERISA plans" by directly 
and indirectly affecting an employer's decisions regarding whether and how to 
offer health benefits. l64 A "reference" also exists since the Ordinance and its 
regulations explicitly refer to employer plans and require employers to examine 
their plans to calculate their expenditure obligations. 165 Enforcing the Ordinance 
additionally interferes with an employer's determination of its overall health 
expenditures. 166 Anyone of these occurrences warrants § 514 preemption; 
combined, they create an impermissible intrusion on employer autonomy and an 
intolerable threat to ERISA's overall goal of nationally uniform plan 
administration. Consequently, en bane review might have affirmed the trial court's 
finding of § 514 preemption. 
The Restaurant Association has petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for 
certiorari. 16? As of April 2010, the Court had not formally granted review; however, 
156. Id. at 659-60 (citing Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 193 (4th Cir. 2007». 
157. Id. (citing Fielder, 475 F.3d at 193). 
158. Id. at 660. 
159. Id. 
160. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 1000, 1001 (9th Cir. 2009). 
161. Id. at 1004, 1006--07 (Smith, 1., dissenting). 
162. 532 U.S. 141 (2001). 
163. Golden Gate Rest. Ass 'n, 558 F.3d at 1004 (Smith, 1., dissenting)(quoting Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 
149). 
164. Id. at 1005. 
165.ld. 
166. Id. at 1008-09. 
167. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008), petition/or 
cert. filed, 130 S. Ct. 357 (June 5, 2009) (No. 08-1515). 
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in October 2009, it asked the U.S. Solicitor General to submit an amicus brief. 168 
This allows the Obama Administration to endorse or reject the prior 
administration's support for the Restaurant Association's unsuccessful preemption 
argument before the Ninth Circuit. 169 There is no formal deadline for the Solicitor 
General's brief, but the customary thirty-day response time has long since 
passed. 170 This may reflect the political risks of taking a stand on this issue amid 
the increasingly antagonistic push to enact health care reform in late 2009 through 
March 2010, and an ongoing reluctance to do so given the fragile support for 
PPACA's enactment. 171 
It is always difficult to predict how the Court will rule in ERISA preemption 
cases. Nevertheless, even before PPACA's enactment, and notwithstanding any 
DOL efforts to exempt "play or pay" mandates from § 514's reach,172 the Court 
would probably have rejected the general objective of requiring employers to play 
or pay as well as San Francisco's specific techniques for doing so. That it will do so 
regardless of the Solicitor General's ultimate position in Golden Gate seems even 
more likely given its April 2010 decision in Conkright v. Frommert. 173 
Focused on the discretion owed to an ERISA plan administrator, the 
Conkright case did not implicate § 514. However, it did lead Justice Roberts, 
writing for a five to three majority,174 to invoke the Court's 2002 preemption ruling 
in Rush Prudential to emphasize that ERISA demands "a predictable set of 
liabilities, under uniform standards of primary conduct and a uniform regime of 
ultimate remedial orders and awards when a violation has occurred.,,175 The 
Conkright majority refused to subject multi-state plans to "patchwork" 
interpretations that "would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program 
168. Id.; see also Press Release, Office of the City Att'y, U.S. Supreme Court Asks Obama 
Administration to Weigh In on "Healthy San Francisco" (Oct. 5, 2009), available at 
http://www.sfcityattomey.org/index.aspx?page=218 (stating that, "[i]n calling for the views of Solicitor 
General Elena Kagan, the Supreme Court has effectively postponed [its] decision" as to whether to grant 
certiorari in Golden Gate); U.S. Supreme Court Docket for No. 08-1515, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/docketfiles/08-1515.htm (last visited June II, 2010) (indicating that no 
response has yet been filed). 
169. Bob Egelko, Top Court Requests Advice on S.F. Plan, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 6, 2009, at AI. 
170. SUP. CT. R. 15(3),37(2) ("Any brief in opposition shall be filed within 30 days after the case is 
placed on the docket, unless the time is extended by the Court or a Justice .... "). 
I 71. See Egelko, supra note 169 (discussing President Obama' s struggle to overhaul health coverage 
nationwide, and the central role that employer-based coverage plays in that debate). Others have 
suggested that the Supreme Court harbors strong deference to Congress as far as ERISA is concerned, 
and that any policy changes relating to the preemption issue must come from the legislature, not the 
courts, for example, JACOBSON, supra note I, at II. 
172. For a discussion of DOL's proposed amendment of29 C.F.R. 2510.3-1 pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 
1135, see supra notes 40-41. 
173. 130 S. Ct. 1640 (20 I 0). 
174. The majority consisted of Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito; Justice Breyer 
dissented, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsberg; Justice Sotomayor took no part in the decision. Id. 
175. Id. at 1649 (quoting Rush v. Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379 (2002». 
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operation, which might lead those employers with existing plans to reduce benefits, 
and those without such plans to refrain from adopting them.,,176 Quoting Egelhoff, it 
stressed that "[u]niformity is impossible ... if plans are subject to different legal 
obligations in different States.,,177 Such insistence on predictability, efficiency and 
uniformity in plan administration makes it highly improbable that the Court will 
tolerate exposing plans to varying "play or pay" requirements at the state and local 
levels. This is especially true for large firms that are now covered by PPACA's 
"play or pay" incentives. San Francisco remains undaunted, however, and actually 
raised employer fair share contributions in April 2010.178 
VI. THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYER MANDATES IN THE COURTS 
In general, fair share measures usually apply to employers instead of their 
benefits plans in order to avoid § 514 preemption. The Supreme Court will 
probably dismiss this as an impermissible attempt to circumvent preemption 
through artful legislative drafting. Fair share laws, especially those that mandate 
some form of payment as Massachusetts and San Francisco do, could also fail for 
effectively forcing employers to establish or alter benefits plans, or fund public 
sources of coverage, whether for their own workers or a general pool. As explained 
in Egelhoff, § 514 preempts forced or restricted administrative choices, regardless 
of any benefits that might accrue from those choices. 179 Consequently, in Golden 
Gate, the "pay" option's quid pro quo-allowing employees to enroll in San 
Francisco's plan or set-up medical reimbursement accounts-may have impressed 
the Ninth Circuit as influencing without dictating plan choices, but is unlikely to 
sway the Supreme Court. Additionally, certain types of mandates may be especially 
vulnerable to "relate to" preemption despite their effort to avoid it. 
For instance, payroll taxes were chosen by Maryland and San Francisco as 
their "pay" option, and are appealing since employers already face an array of 
federal, state, and local taxes. ISO To date, varying tax liabilities have not qualified 
as § 514 preempted conflicting state directives. 181 Given public disdain for new 
176. Id. (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. I, 11(1987». 
177. Id. at 1651 (quoting Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001». 
178. See Erin Sherbert, Healthy SF Fees Set to Increase, S. F. EXAMINER, Apr. 23, 2010, available 
at http://www.sfexaminer.comllocallHealthy-SF-fees-set-to-increase-91887114.html (noting that fees 
for employers with twenty to ninety-nine workers will increase in 2011 from $1.31 to $1.37 per hour, 
and, for 100 or more workers, will increase from $1.96 to $2.06). 
179. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 146-47. 
180. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-103(a)(I)(iii) (West Supp. 2006), invalidated by Retail 
Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007); S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 14.3(a) 
(2006), available at http://library.municode.comlindex.aspx?clientId=14131 &stateld=5&stateName= 
California (follow "Chapter 14" hyperlink). 
181. See, e.g., De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund., 520 U.S. 806 (1997). In De 
Buono, the Court considered whether ERISA preempted New York from imposing a gross receipts tax 
on the income of medical centers operated by ERlSA funds. /d. at 808-{)9. The Court held that ERISA 
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taxes, state and local legislators may prefer the term "contribution" to "tax," but the 
latter would be the wiser choice if trying to avoid preemption. A tax also holds the 
advantage of arguably creating an indirect financial incentive regarding the 
existence and structure of a plan as permitted in Travelers. However, Travelers 
stated that even indirect financial incentives will be preempted if they effectively 
bind the plan's choices. 182 Section 514 preemption occurred in Egelhoff, where the 
only "choice" was to comply with state law or alter the benefits plan.183 Since this 
is also true for "play or pay" mandates,l84 the Supreme Court will probably 
characterize a public-pay option as preempted under § 514 as a restriction of plan 
choice. 
Flat fees-a variant of the "pay" option such as the per capita, annual 
"contribution" enacted in Massachusetts and proposed in California's failed state 
reform effort-present other problems. California had initially pegged the 
contribution to cover workers at firms opting to pay the state in lieu of paying for 
health care directly.18s Because this seemed too close to a benefits mandate 
preempted under § 514, the contribution was redirected to a general pool.I86 The 
advantage of an annual flat fee is that it is less administratively burdensome than 
the ongoing calculations needed to satisfY a quarterly payroll tax. 187 There is still a 
problem though since, as in Egelhoff, the only alternative to making the mandated 
contribution is to offer health benefits that meet the statutorily required minimum 
coverage. 188 This is particularly concerning where employers that neither play nor 
pay face "free rider" penalties, as they would in Massachusetts. 189 That this penalty 
did not preempt the New York tax law and reasoned that the tax was "one of 'myriad state laws' of 
general applicability that impose some burdens on the administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless 
do not 'relate to' them within the meaning of [ERISA]." Id. at 815. The Court further noted that "[a]ny 
state tax, or other law, that increases the cost of providing benefits to covered employees will have some 
effect on the administration of ERISA plans, but that simply cannot mean that every state law with such 
an effect is pre-empted by the federal statute." Id. at 816. 
182. N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 664 
(1995). 
183. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at ISO-51. 
184. Fielder, 475 F.3d at 183. 
185. See generally Rick Curtis & Ed Neuschler, Affording Shared Responsibility for Universal 
Coverage: Insights from California, HEALTH AFF., Mar. 24, 2009, at w417, w420-29 (analyzing key 
features from California's latest experience in working towards developing a plan for universal health 
coverage with a "shared responsibility" framework between individuals, employers, and state 
governmentalities ). 
186. See id. at w425-26 (noting that the contributions were used as credits against money the 
employer owed to the state). 
187. See Rick Curtis & Ed Neuschler, Designing Health Insurance Market Constructs for Shared 
Responsibility: Insights from California, HEALTH AFF., Mar. 24, 2009, at w431, w437-38 (noting that 
fees only require a majority vote, while taxes require a two-thirds vote for enactment). 
188. Cf Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147. 
189. See Mary Ann Chirba-Martin & Andres Torres, Universal Health Care in Massachusetts: 
Setting the Standard for National Reform, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 409, 440 (2008) (discussing several 
implications that the Massachusetts "free rider" penalties imposes on employers). 
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attaches only when an uncovered worker uses uncompensated care under certain 
conditions does not erase the concern; it is the restriction of choice and intrusion on 
administration that is the problem, not the dollar amount involved. Thus, § 514 may 
preempt a flat fee as an improper interference with plan administration. 
A novel approach is Illinois's proposed "privilege to employ" fee, which 
would require covered employers to pay a flat fee each year for the privilege of 
hiring each worker. This might survive § 514 preemption if the fee applies without 
regard to the extent of the employer's health care expenditures. This completely 
divorces the mandated payment from plan design and administration even though 
the resulting revenues could be used to finance expanded coverage.190 Nevertheless, 
Illinois' proposed fee might undermine the basic purpose of fair share mandates by 
doing little to encourage the creation of new benefits plans, leading some firms to 
curtail or drop existing coverage. 
Recording and reporting requirements used to monitor and enforce "play or 
pay" provisions may trigger preemption problems, too. PPACA requires large 
employers to submit annual reports to the Treasury Department stating whether it 
offers coverage to full-time employees and, if so, whether waiting periods applied, 
how many workers were covered during each month, along with the name, address 
and tax identification number of each such employee and their months of 
coverage.191 State and local "shared responsibility" intiatives typically impose 
recording and reporting obligations, too, although differing on the content and 
timing of reports. 192 
States will argue that § 514 preemption is not implicated since merely 
recording and reporting in no way interferes with the processing or payment of 
benefits claims per se. \93 According to Egelhoff, however, "[ r ]equiring ERISA 
administrators to master the relevant laws of 50 States" regarding plan design and 
administration jeopardizes ERISA's goal of national uniformity and efficient plan 
administration.194 As such, this future of state and local "play or pay" mandates is 
clearly threatened by § 514 preemption. 195 
190. Compare S. 5, 95th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 50-301 (11.2007) (imposing a flat fee regardless 
of employer expenditures on health care), with Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 
195-97 (4th Cir. 2007) (striking down Maryland's "play or pay" legislation, which mandated payment 
depending on the level of employee coverage). 
191. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 10108. 
192. For a discussion of varying requirements of Maryland, Suffolks County, and San Francisco, see 
supra Parts IV -V. 
193. Cf Minn. Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Minn. Dep't of Labor & 
Indus., 866 F. Supp. 1244, 1247 (D. Minn. 1993) ("The requirements of calculating costs and keeping 
records may somewhat increase the cost of the benefits plans, but this incidental impact on the plans 
need not lead to preemption."). 
194. Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 149-50 (2001). 
195. See id. at 150 (suggesting that complying with different state recording and reporting 
requirements might cause a lack of uniformity that ERISA preemption was intended to avoid). 
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Cafeteria plans under § 125 of the Internal Revenue Code allow employees to 
pay for health care with pre-tax dollars, while permitting employers to reduce their 
FICA withholdings by about $160 per participating employee:96 Under federal 
law, § 125 cafeteria plans are entirely optional for employers and do not qualify as 
ERISA benefit plans. 197 States have been increasingly attracted to § 125 plans since 
they may lower employer and employee costs and expand coverage without 
violating § 514.198 As of May 2009, five states require employers to offer cafeteria 
plans: Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, and Rhode Island. 199 
Seven states do not require, but encourage them through employer incentives: 
Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Tennessee, and Washington.2oo During the 
2009 legislative session, another six considered, but did not pass § 125 mandates: 
Alaska, California, Kansas, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Oklahoma. 20 I 
Relatively speaking, however, § 125 mandates and incentives have been 
easier to enact than "play or pay" mandates, largely because they are often viewed 
as more likely to survive "relate to" preemption?02 Yet, even though cafeteria plans 
are not themselves ERISA plans, mandating their creation could violate § 514's 
explicit ban on state benefits mandates. While simpler to set up and operate than 
direct benefits plans, § 125 plans still entail administrative costs in terms of both 
time and money. An employer may realize some $160 per employee savings in 
FICA withholdings, but may also spend about $100 per employee to create and 
administer a health-only cafeteria plan.203 Conceivably, then, the Supreme Court 
could decide that the logistics of having to do so in one state but not in another may 
interfere with the national uniformity that ERISA is determined to preserve?04 
196. Cauchi, supra note 82. 
197. [d. However, PPACA prohibits an employee from using pre-tax § 125 contributions to purchase 
coverage through a health exchange. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1515(a) (amending 
26 U.S.C. § 125(f)(3». 
198. Cauchi, supra note 82. 
199. [d. 
200. [d. 
201. [d. None of these six states passed the legislation in 2009. See S. 61, 26th Leg., 2009-10 Reg. 
Sess. (Alaska 2010) (referred to Labor & Commerce Committee); S. 594, 2009-10 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2010) (returned to the Secretary of the Senate); S. 2262, 2009-10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2010) 
(referred to Appropriations Committee); H.R. 573, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009) (referred to 
Insurance Committee); Assem. 2283, 2008-09 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2009) (withdrawn from 
consideration); H.R. 1034,2009-10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010) (referred to Appropriations & Budget 
Committee). Of these states, however, each has proposed similar legislation in 2010, with Mississippi 
being the only state to pass the legislation. S. 2554, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2010). 
202. Compare Cauchi, supra note 82 (listing thirteen states that successfully use either mandatory or 
optional § 125 plans), with Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 197 (4th Cir. 2007), 
and Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 416-17 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(invalidating "play or pay" mandates as being § 514 "relate to" preempted). 
203. Cauchi, supra note 82. 
204. See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148-49 (2001) ("One of the principal goals of 
ERISA is ... to establish a uniform administrative scheme .... " (quotations omitted». 
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CONCLUSION: A CALL FOR CONGRESSIONAL GUIDANCE ON THE ROLE OF STATE 
AND LOCAL "PLAY OR PAY" PROVISIONS FOLLOWING FEDERAL REFORM 
Regardless of the wisdom of federal health reform in general and "play or 
pay" measures in particular, passing either, let alone both through PP ACA was an 
epic political accomplishment. Perhaps it is because Congress is so deeply divided 
and voting blocks are so fragile that PPACA uses a "play or pay" incentive instead 
of a mandate. This may also explain why the statute's employer responsibility 
language says nothing about ERISA or PP ACA itself preempting states from 
requiring more in terms of minimum benefits or fair share contributions. 
Massachusetts, for instance, does require more in terms of employers covered 
(eleven or more full-time workers in contrast with PPACA's requirement of fifty) 
and payments (mandatory fair share contributions of some kind as opposed to 
PP ACA' s imposition of penalties only if free-riding actually occurs). 205 Thus, the 
courts are left to divine whether Congress intended PP ACA (either independently 
or in conjunction with ERISA) to preempt similar state mandates or merely set a 
minimum floor. Failing to clarify this jeopardizes the gains in covering workers at 
small firms already realized in Massachusetts and Vermont.206 Since the early U.S. 
House and Senate proposals and the [mal version of PPACA leave § 514 
preemption intact, most courts would probably find that a federal employer 
mandate would preempt comparable state measures, but others could differ just as 
they have in handling the endless array of preemption battles over the past three 
decades.207 
Amidst all of these uncertainties, one thing remains clear: PPACA may have 
drastically increased the federal government's role in overseeing health care, but 
even 2000 page bills208 leave more than enough for the states to do. PPACA's 
heavy reliance on what Massachusetts had already done without addressing 
preemption head-on can cut both ways. Arguably, Congress intended § 1513's 
"play or pay" provision to peacefully co-exist with Massachusetts' and San 
Francisco's more rigorous requirements. Alternatively, § 1513's clear differences 
signal a rejection and displacement of the their approach. Such competing scenarios 
make Congress' avoidance of the preemption question not only confusing, but 
inexcusable. Thus, it must clarify when and to what extent § 514 preempts state 
reform initiatives in general and employer mandates in particular. Otherwise, as 
Congress' long awaited and hard-fought response to an intractable national crisis, 
PP ACA will have made the ever-confounding area of ERISA preemption even 
more impenetrable simply by saying nothing about it. 
205. Compare Parts I, V. 
206. [d. 
207. See supra Part II. 
208. See, e.g., H.R. 3962, Illth Congo (1st Sess. 2009); H.R. 3590, II Ith Congo (1st Sess. 2009). 

